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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Christopher F. Donahue appeals the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the defendants and 
against Donahue in his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. The district court based its ruling on its 
determination that each of the defendants had either 
qualified or absolute immunity. The suit arises from the 
investigation and prosecution of a marijuana distribution 
conspiracy involving Donahue. He alleges a civil rights 
claim based upon defendants' purported malicious 
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prosecution of him in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.2 
 
I. FACTS 
 
In late 1990, State Troopers Pease and Girard were the 
lead officers in an investigation of a marijuana distribution 
ring involving a Berks County resident named "Erwin 
Bieber." In June of that year, Pease learned that a 
marijuana dealer in Albuquerque, New Mexico was 
regularly placing telephone calls from Albuquerque to 
southeastern Pennsylvania. The telephone numbers he was 
calling were listed to a telephone in Montgomery County 
and one in Berks County. The Berks County number was 
assigned to a business called "Guitars East." Erwin Bieber 
received mail at the address listed for that business. 
 
Pease responded by acquiring information that included 
Bieber's telephone toll records. Meanwhile, the Albuquerque 
Police Department placed a pen register on the New Mexico 
dealer's telephone line.3 A pen register was also installed on 
the Montgomery County telephone that the New Mexico 
dealer was calling. Pease also learned that another 
telephone was registered to Bieber at the address of 
"Guitars East." The Montgomery County telephone involved 
in calls to and from Albuquerque was also frequently being 
used in making calls to and from Bieber's telephones. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to Donahue's claim as arising 
only under the Fourth Amendment even though the Fourth Amendment 
applies to the defendants via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Karnes v. 
Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 488 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1995). 
 
2. Although we are affirming, we do so on grounds that are different from 
the analysis of the district court. See Brumfield v. Sanders, 232 F.3d 
376, 399 n.2 (3rd Cir. 2000) ("An appellate court may affirm a result 
reached by the District Court on different reasons .. . as long as the 
record supports the judgment."). 
 
3. "A pen register is a `device which records or decodes electronic or 
other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise 
transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached.' " 
United States v. Riddick 156 F.3d 505, 510 n.5 (3rd Cir. 1998)(citations 
omitted). 
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In late 1990, the Berks County District Attorney's Office 
was asked to assist in the ongoing investigation the 
Pennsylvania State Police were conducting into this 
marijuana distribution ring, and Troopers Pease and Girard 
informed the Berks County District Attorney's Office of the 
information they had received from the Albuquerque Police 
Department. Yatron was then the Berks County District 
Attorney and James Gavin was an Assistant District 
Attorney. On October 2, 1990, the State Police installed pen 
registers on the two telephone lines registered to Bieber and 
Guitars East pursuant to authorizations obtained from the 
Berks County Court of Common Pleas. 
 
Yatron and Gavin eventually filed two applications with 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court seeking authorization to 
conduct non-consensual electronic surveillance on Bieber's 
two telephone lines.4 The application included an affidavit 
signed by Troopers Pease and Girard. The Superior Court 
granted the application and entered orders authorizing 
interception of wire and oral communications on Bieber's 
two telephone lines. 
 
Trooper Pacelli installed and activated monitoring 
equipment on Bieber's telephone lines pursuant to those 
authorizations.5 Thereafter, from October 12, to November 
17, 1990, Pease, Girard, and other Troopers working with 
them listened to the telephone calls to and from Bieber's 
two telephones.6 The monitored conversations included 
discussions between Bieber and Donahue. 
 
State Police had not been aware of Donahue before they 
began monitoring Bieber's telephone conversations. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Unlike the pen registers that only recorded numbers dialed from 
Bieber's two phones, the October 12 request sought authorization to 
actually listen to (i.e., "seize") the contents of conversations on those 
phones. 
 
5. Trooper Pacelli held a class "B" certification under the applicable 
Pennsylvania regulations, and that authorized him to perform such 
installations. He was trained and experienced in the installation and use 
of the monitoring equipment. 
 
6. All of the troopers working with Pease and Girard had Class "A" 
certifications under the applicable Pennsylvania regulations for 
monitoring telephone calls. 
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However, once they began monitoring those calls, the State 
Police heard and recorded a number of conversations 
between Bieber and a "Christopher Donahue" residing at 
1503 Callowhill Road in Perkasie, Pennsylvania. 
 
We need not reiterate the rather involved chronology of 
the investigation that followed, the content of the many 
conversations that police recorded between Bieber and 
Donahue, or the results of the surveillance the police 
conducted while monitoring those calls. For our purposes, 
it is sufficient to note that the numerous discussions 
between Bieber and Donahue implicated both of them in a 
large conspiracy to distribute substantial quantities of 
marijuana in and around Berks County, Pennsylvania. 
Eventually, police learned that Bieber was receiving 
marijuana from sources in California and New Mexico and 
distributing it to several people in Pennsylvania, including 
Donahue. 
 
On November 17, 1990, police followed Bieber to 
Philadelphia International Airport where he met two other 
men with suitcases. Police followed the trio from the airport 
to 1503 Callowhill Road, Donahue's residence. Police 
maintained surveillance as Bieber and his companions then 
drove to a trailer home owned by Steve Hartman. Police 
arrested the trio along with Hartman shortly after they left 
Hartman's trailer. 
 
Bieber began to talk to the police almost immediately. He 
told Trooper Pease that he recently received 16 pounds of 
marijuana from suppliers in California and that he had 
delivered all 16 pounds to Donahue on November 7, 1990. 
Police arrested Donahue after additional investigation, and 
charged him with conspiracy to distribute marijuana, 
conspiracy to participate in a corrupt organization, and 
possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. The 
arrest warrant for Donahue was based upon a criminal 
complaint that incorporated an affidavit of probable cause 
that Pease and Girard signed. 
 
Donahue filed a suppression motion prior to trial. He 
argued that the electronic surveillance had been initiated 
and maintained in a manner that violated the Pennsylvania 
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 PA. 
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CONST. STAT. ANN. SS 5701-5748. After the suppression 
motion was denied, Donahue proceeded to trial before a 
jury. 
 
Bieber was one of the prosecution witnesses at that trial. 
He testified about his extensive drug dealings with 
Donahue, including the aforementioned delivery of 16 
pounds of marijuana on November 7, 1990. The jury 
convicted Donahue of all the charges against him. 
 
On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
reversed and ordered a new trial. That court held that, 
given Bieber's testimony, the trial court committed 
reversible error in not giving a "corrupt source" jury 
instruction. Commonwealth v. Donahue, 630 A.2d 1238, 
1246-47 (Pa. Super. 1993).7 However, the court rejected all 
of Donahue's other arguments, including his argument that 
his suppression motion should have been granted because 
the electronic surveillance was contrary to law. Id. at 278- 
281.8 Donahue's Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied. Donahue v. 
Commonwealth, 645 A.2d 1316 (Pa. 1994). 
 
In January of 1997, the Berks County Court of Common 
Pleas dismissed the corrupt organizations charges against 
Donahue based upon intervening changes in the applicable 
case law. At that point, Donahue had already spent more 
than two and one-half years in prison on his sentence. The 
Berks County District Attorney concluded that Donahue 
would not receive any additional incarceration if he were to 
be convicted in a retrial pursuant to the Superior Court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Superior Court held that "It is reversible error for a trial court 
not 
to give an accomplice charge if the evidence permits an inference that a 
witness was an accomplice." 630 A.2d at 1247 (citation omitted). 
 
8. In its opinion, the Superior Court noted that Donahue alleged in his 
appeal that the violations of the Wiretap Act were constitutional 
violations. However, the Superior Court found that"no constitutional 
claims were preserved in post-verdict motions. We therefore deem any 
constitutional claims in this regard to be waived for our review." 630 
A.2d at 1248. Consequently, "grounds for suppression . . . are limited to 
incriminating evidence resulting from a wiretap based on an interception 
which was unlawful or otherwise conducted in contravention of judicial 
order, or because the judicial order was insufficient on its face." Id. 
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remand. Accordingly, the Assistant District Attorney who 
was then assigned to the case asked the trial court to enter 
a nolle prosequi ("nol pros"), thereby terminating the 
prosecution. The state court granted that request, and 
those charges that remained after the remand were 
dismissed. 
 
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 
A. The 1995 Action. 
 
In April of 1995, Donahue filed a two-count complaint in 
the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983. He sought 
monetary damages against Berks County as well as Yatron, 
Gavin, Pease, and Girard, based upon the electronic 
surveillance that had been conducted during the 1990-91 
investigation and prosecution. In Count I of his complaint, 
he alleged an illegal search and seizure in violation of the 
Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Count II alleged 
violations of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance Act, 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. SS 5701-5748. 
 
The defendants moved for summary judgment or 
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6), based upon 
the applicable statutes of limitations. The district court 
agreed, and entered orders dismissing the suit on January 
4, 1996. Donahue did not appeal. 
 
B. The 1998 Action. 
 
In 1998, Donahue filed another civil action based upon 
the aforementioned investigation and prosecution. The 
complaint asserted: a S 1983 Fourth Amendment claim for 
malicious prosecution against Berks County, Yatron, Gavin, 
Pease and Girard (Count 1); a S 1983 Fourth Amendment 
illegal search and seizure claim against D.A. Gavin, 
Assistant D.A. Yatron, several Troopers involved in the 
electronic monitoring, including Pease and Girard, 
Pennsylvania Deputy Attorney General Richard Patton, 
First Savings Bank of Perkasie, First Savings employee 
Robert Schwartz and Berks County (Count II);9 a S 1983 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Donahue sued the bank and its employee because the bank gave the 
state police information about Donahue's bank accounts during the 
investigation. 
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deprivation of property claim against Patton, Schwartz and 
First Savings (Count III);10 claims for a violation of the Right 
to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U. S. C. SS 3401-3422, against 
First Savings and Loan and an employee of that bank 11 
(Count IV); and various claims of violations of the 
Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Control Act 
against Gavin, Yatron, Pease, Patton, Trooper Jeffrey 
Hawbecker and Montgomery County District Attorney 
Michael Marino (Counts V-VIII). 
 
The defendants filed various motions to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and for judgment on the pleadings 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). By Memoranda and Orders 
dated December 8, 1998 and March 12, 1999, the district 
court dismissed all but one claim and most of the 
defendants. See Donahue v. Gavin, 1999 WL 165700 (E. D. 
Pa. 1999). The court held that all federal claims for 
unlawful search and seizure against Berks County, Yatron, 
Gavin, Pease and Girard were precluded both by the 
judgment in the 1995 action and by the applicable statutes 
of limitations. It also ruled that all claims under the 
Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act were barred by the statute of limitations. 
 
As a result of that ruling, the only claim remaining was 
Count I - the S 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under 
the Fourth Amendment. However, the district court ruled 
that that claim could only be asserted against Berks 
County, Yatron, Gavin (the "County Defendants") and Pease 
and Girard (the "State Defendants"), and the suit proceeded 
to discovery. At the close of discovery, all of the remaining 
defendants moved for summary judgment. The County 
Defendants argued that they had either absolute or 
qualified immunity. The State Defendants argued that 
Donahue could not establish a Fourth Amendment violation 
as a matter of law, and that even if he could, they were also 
entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
Donahue opposed the defendants' summary judgment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Donahue ultimately withdrew Count III. 
 
11. Police obtained financial information about Donahue from the bank 
during the course of the investigation. 
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motions and also filed a motion to suppress all of the 
evidence derived from the electronic surveillance. He argued 
that suppression was required because the wiretap 
evidence was obtained in violation of Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 
U.S.C. SS 2510-2520. The district court granted each of the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court held 
that the County Defendants had absolute immunity and 
that the State Defendants had qualified immunity. Donahue 
v. Gavin, 2000 WL 772819 (E. D. Pa. 2000). 
 
This appeal followed. Donahue only appeals the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the State and County 
Defendants on the S 1983 malicious prosecution claim.12 No 
other issues are before us. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
 
The essence of Donahue's S 1983 malicious prosecution 
suit against the State Defendants is that Pease and Girard 
lacked probable cause to initiate the criminal proceedings 
against him. Similarly, the essence of his S 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim against the County Defendants is that 
Yatron and Gavin did not have probable cause to prosecute 
him. As noted, both the County Defendants and the State 
Defendants asserted qualified immunity.13  
 
Donahue attempts to establish this absence of probable 
cause in a unique manner. He asks the court to suppress 
the very evidence that would be relevant to determining if 
the defendants had probable cause. He argues that the 
suppression remedy contained in Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is 
plenary. Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
13. The County Defendants also raised the defense of absolute immunity 
to all acts undertaken in their decision to prosecute Donahue and to all 
acts taken in preparation necessary to present their case. See 2000 WL 
772819 at * 3. 
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SS 2510-2520,14 is not restricted to criminal prosecutions. 
See Br. of Appellant, 17-20. Accordingly, Donahue claims 
that the district court should have ruled on his suppression 
motion before determining whether defendants were 
protected by any form of immunity. He argues: 
 
       The motion to suppress should have been ruled upon 
       -- and granted -- first. The Court should not have 
       considered the wiretap evidence in ruling on the 
       summary judgment motions because Defendants 
       obtained and used this material illegally. 
 
Id. at 16. 
 
B. 
 
Government officials exercising discretionary functions 
have qualified immunity from suits seeking damages under 
S 1983 "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Wilson v. 
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000) ("According to the 
doctrine of qualified immunity, law enforcement officers 
acting within their professional capacity are generally 
immune from trial insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.")(citations 
and internal quotations omitted).15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. For example, Donahue argues: "[d]espite . . . assertions contained in 
their applications and supporting affidavits that there was probable 
cause to support the approval of the proposed wiretap order, Pease has 
since admitted the lack of probable cause." Appellant's Br. at 4. 
 
"Defendants falsely stated that Pease and Girard were qualified to 
conduct the wiretaps, when they were not." Id. "Pease and Girard falsely 
swore that all conventional investigative techniques (such as physical 
surveillance) had been either exhausted or were impossible to use. . . . 
In fact, they were had not even attempted to use any conventional 
investigative techniques." Id. Donahue also claims that "Gavin played a 
large role in supporting and directing the investigation, . . . ." Id. at 
6. 
 
15. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430 (1976), the Supreme Court 
extended absolute immunity to prosecutors when their"activities were 
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As noted above, the district court decided this case on 
grounds of the defendants' immunity and concluded that it 
did not need to address the applicability of Title III's 
suppression remedy. Although we agree that the defendants 
are entitled to judgment, we conclude that the district court 
should not have reached the issue of the defendants' 
qualified immunity without first addressing whether 
Donahue even alleged a civil rights claim. The Supreme 
Court has held that courts must "determine first whether 
the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional 
right at all" when a government official raises qualified 
immunity as a defense to an action under S 1983. County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 842 n.5 (1998). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." 
More specifically, the Court held that "in initiating a prosecution and in 
presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit 
for damages under S 1983." Id. at 431. Therefore, a prosecutor is 
absolutely immune when acting as an advocate in judicial proceedings. 
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U. S. 118, 125 (1997). However, "a prosecutor 
acting in an investigative or administrative capacity is protected only by 
qualified immunity." Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 
1992)(citations omitted). "In determining whether absolute immunity is 
available for particular actions, the courts engage in a `functional 
analysis' of each alleged activity." Id. (citations omitted). "The 
decision to 
initiate a prosecution is at the core of a prosecutor's judicial role." 
Id. 
Thus, "[a] prosecutor is absolutely immune when making this decision, 
even where he acts without a good faith belief that any wrongdoing has 
occurred." Id. 
 
Donahue concedes that the County Defendants have absolute 
immunity with regard to their actions during the judicial phase of his 
prosecution. However, he attempts to circumvent that immunity by 
alleging that they engaged in misconduct in the investigative phase. 
More particularly, he points to their roles in gathering evidence, his 
allegation that they fabricated evidence, his allegations of false 
swearing 
on an arrest warrant, his allegations of their covering up the illegal 
wiretaps and his allegations that they made false statements in press 
conferences they held. "Evidence obtained at or after the filing is likely 
to be connected with an existing prosecution, and is absolutely 
protected." Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1465. However, a prosecutor is not 
entitled to absolute immunity when holding a press conference, or when 
he allegedly fabricated evidence concerning an unsolved crime. Kalina, 
522 U.S. at 126. 
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Accordingly, in Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 
1997), we stated: 
 
       Where a defendant asserts a qualified immunity 
       defense in a motion for summary judgment, the 
       plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the 
       defendant's conduct violated some clearly established 
       statutory or constitutional right. Only if the plaintiff 
       carries this initial burden must the defendant then 
       demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact 
       remains as to the objective reasonableness of the 
       defendant's belief in the lawfulness of his actions. This 
       procedure eliminates the needless expenditure of 
       money and time by one who justifiably asserts a 
       qualified immunity defense from suit. 
 
Id. at 399 (citations omitted, and internal quotation marks 
omitted)(emphasis added). 
 
Determining whether plaintiff has alleged a violation of a 
statutory or constitutional right is, therefore, the threshold 
issue, and the Supreme Court has clearly instructed that 
we must not "assum[e], without deciding, this preliminary 
issue." Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 232 (1991). Thus, 
the district court should only have considered the 
defendants' claim of immunity if Donahue first established 
that their conduct violated a clearly established statutory or 
constitutional right. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.2d at 786 
(courts "should . . . proceed to determine whether that right 
was clearly established at the time of the alleged 
violation."). Accordingly, "we begin [our analysis] with the 
predicate question of whether [Donahue's] allegations are 
sufficient to establish a violation of a constitutional right at 
all." Sherwood,113 F.3d at 399 (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
C. 
 
Prior to 1994, we allowed plaintiffs to bring malicious 
prosecution claims under S 1983 by alleging the common 
law elements of the tort. See Lee v. Mihalich , 847 F.2d 66, 
69-70 (3d Cir. 1988). In order to prove malicious 
prosecution under Pennsylvania law the plaintiff had to 
prove: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) 
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the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff 's favor; (3) the 
proceeding was initiated without probable cause; and (4) 
the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other 
than bringing the plaintiff to justice. Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 
F.3d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1996)(citing Haefner v. Burkey, 626 
A.2d 519, 521 (Pa. 1993)). We had always assumed that by 
proving a violation of the common law tort, the plaintiff 
proved a violation of substantive due process that would 
support a S 1983 claim for malicious prosecution suit. See 
Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 
1998)(citing Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (3d 
Cir. 1993)). 
 
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U. S. 266 (1994), significantly changed that 
legal landscape. There, Albright was released on bail after 
surrendering on an outstanding arrest warrant. The 
criminal prosecution was ultimately dismissed because the 
charges did not constitute an offense under state law. 
Thereafter, Albright filed a S 1983 action against Oliver, the 
police officer who had obtained the arrest warrant. Albright 
claimed that Oliver had deprived him of his Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process right to be "free from 
criminal prosecution except upon probable cause." Id. at 
269. 
 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of four 
justices, noted that Albright's claim was "a very limited one" 
that did not raise procedural due process or Fourth 
Amendment claims. Id. at 271. The plurality then 
commented that "as a general matter, the Court has always 
been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due 
process, preferring, instead, to limit substantive due 
process protections to matters relating to marriage, family, 
procreation, and the right to bodily integrity." Id. at 271-72. 
Consequently, the plurality believed that Albright's claim 
"to be free from prosecution except on the basis of probable 
cause is markedly different" from the generally recognized 
type of substantive due process protections" and held that 
"[w]here a particular amendment provides an explicit 
textual source of constitutional protection against a 
particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, 
not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, 
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must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Id. at 272, 
273. 
 
Accordingly, the plurality held that "substantive due 
process, with its scarce and open-ended guideposts," 
provided no relief. Id. at 275. However, while the plurality 
"express[ed] no view" as to whether the Fourth Amendment 
would provide relief to Albright, it intimated that Albright 
could have obtained some relief under the Fourth 
Amendment had he raised that issue. Id. at 274. Other 
members of the Court agreed. Id. at 814-817 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in judgment); id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment and joined by Thomas, J.); id. at 
288-89 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). 
 
In Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, supra,  we had our first 
opportunity to consider Albright's impact upon our S 1983 
malicious prosecution jurisprudence. There, a federal grand 
jury indicted Gallo for arson. "He never was arrested, 
detained, or handcuffed" following indictment, but certain 
restrictions were imposed upon him in lieu of bail. 161 F.3d 
at 219. Gallo subsequently discovered that the local fire 
marshal had altered his original report so as to suggest 
that a fire at Gallo's warehouse had been caused by arson 
rather than a faulty electrical appliance. The fire marshal 
had also changed his report to corroborate that accusation. 
 
Gallo was acquitted after his defense counsel vigorously 
cross-examined the fire marshal about the discrepancies in 
his report. Following his acquittal, Gallo brought aS 1983 
civil rights action against the fire marshal and others who 
had been involved in his prosecution. He alleged that the 
defendants "had caused the federal government to 
prosecute him without probable cause." 161 F3d at 220. 
 
The district court construed Gallo's S 1983 action as one 
for malicious prosecution and held that, under Albright, 
Gallo must show a Fourth Amendment violation in order to 
prove the malicious prosecution constituted a 
constitutional injury. However, inasmuch as Gallo was 
never detained on the charges, he could not establish a 
constitutional injury. 
 
On Gallo's appeal, we noted that the Court in Albright 
"left open the possibility that Albright could have succeeded 
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if he had relied on the Fourth Amendment." 161 F.3d at 
222. We then wrote that 
 
       [b]y stating that `the accused is not entitled to judicial 
       oversight or review of the decision to prosecute,' 
       Albright implies that prosecution without probable 
       cause is not, in and of itself, a constitutional tort. 
       Instead, the constitutional violation is the deprivation of 
       liberty accompanying the prosecution. Thus, . . . a 
       plaintiff asserting a malicious prosecution claim must 
       show some deprivation of liberty consistent with the 
       concept of seizure. 
 
Id. (citations and certain internal quotations 
omitted)(emphasis added). Continuing our analysis, we 
noted that because "under the common law, the tort of 
malicious prosecution concerns perversion of legal 
procedures," Gallo was required to "show that he suffered 
a seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding." Id. We 
concluded that the post-indictment restrictions placed on 
Gallo's liberty constituted a seizure. Consequently, we 
reversed the district court and remanded for further  
proceedings.16 Id. at 225. 
 
Eight days after we decided Gallo, we once again had 
occasion to view a S 1983 malicious prosecution suit 
through the lens of Albright. In Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 
F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 1998), we held, inter alia, that post- 
conviction incarceration is not a seizure within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, post-conviction 
incarceration cannot constitute a Fourth Amendment 
violation. Id. at 173-175. 
 
Officer McLaughlin arrested Torres after the officer 
claimed to have seen Torres selling cocaine. The next day, 
the district attorney issued a criminal complaint charging 
Torres with unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to 
deliver. McLaughlin was the only prosecution witness at 
trial. Torres testified on his own behalf, denied the charges 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. We remanded because the district court did not rule on whether 
Gallo had satisfied the common law elements of a malicious prosecution 
claim or whether certain of the defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity. 161 F.3d at 220. 
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and argued that McLaughlin should not be believed. The 
jury believed McLaughlin and Torres was convicted, and 
sentenced to three to six years in prison. 
 
About seven and one-half months later, Torres moved for 
a new trial. The state did not oppose the motion and told 
the court that if a new trial was granted, the state would 
ask the court to enter a nol pros and terminate the case. 
The change of heart resulted from information that 
suggested that McLaughlin lied in obtaining a search 
warrant in an unrelated case. The state had since learned 
that McLaughlin was a "rogue cop" and had moved to nol 
pros 53 other cases in which McLaughlin had been an 
essential witness. The court granted Torres' motion, and 
the charges were dismissed pursuant to the nol pros that 
the court entered pursuant to the prosecution's request. 
 
Thereafter, Torres filed a S 1983 action in the district 
court. His suit included a claim that the conduct of 
McLaughlin and others constituted malicious prosecution 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. McLaughlin argued 
that he was entitled to qualified immunity on theS 1983 
claim and moved for summary judgment. The district court 
denied the motion, and McLaughlin appealed.17 McLaughlin 
argued to us that Torres' prosecution did not amount to a 
constitutional violation, or, in the alternative, that he was 
entitled to qualified immunity for any violation that may 
have occurred. 
 
The only issue before us was Torres' Fourth Amendment 
claim, which we characterized "as a claim based on 
McLaughlin's role in initiating the prosecution by conveying 
false information to the prosecutor." Torres,  at 172. We 
stressed that "[t]he harm resulting from this action is 
Torres's incarceration after the jury found him guilty." Id. 
We then inquired into whether "Torres's post-conviction 
incarceration was a Fourth Amendment seizure." Id. at 
173-74 (emphasis added). After discussing Albright and 
related cases, we concluded that: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. "[A]n order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the 
dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a`final' judgment 
subject to immediate appeal." Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S. 299, 307 
(1996). 
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       the limits of Fourth Amendment protection relate to the 
       boundary between arrest and pretrial detention. At 
       most, there may be some circumstances during pre- 
       trial detention that implicate Fourth Amendment 
       rights; however, we refer to the Fourth Amendment as 
       applying to those actions which occur between arrest 
       and pre-trial detention. See United States v. Johnstone, 
       107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir.1997) (commenting that 
       "[w]here the seizure ends and pre-trial detention begins 
       is a difficult question"). Therefore, consistent with our 
       language in Johnstone, we conclude that post- 
       conviction incarceration cannot be a seizure within the 
       meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and Torres's 
       incarceration did not violate his Fourth Amendment 
       rights. 
 
Id. at 174 (emphasis added). 
 
It was not appropriate to inquire into qualified or 
absolute immunity because Torres had not alleged a Fourth 
Amendment violation. Id. at 174-75. Accordingly, we 
reversed and directed the district court to enter summary 
judgment in favor of McLaughlin on Torres's Fourth 
Amendment claim for malicious prosecution. Id.  at 175. 
That is precisely the situation posed by Donahue'sS 1983 
claim for malicious prosecution. 
 
Albright, Gallo and Torres are clearly implicated here 
because Donahue's S 1983 malicious prosecution action is 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment. His complaint alleges: 
"[t]he defendants Berks County, Yatron, Gavin, Girard and 
Pease violated Donahue's right to be free of malicious 
prosecution by state actors under color of law pursuant to 
the 4th Amendment." Complaint, P 165. However, Donahue 
is attempting to recover for post-conviction losses. The 
district court properly noted: 
 
       [p]laintiff alleges in his complaint that"defendants 
       Berks County, Yatron, Gavin, Girard, and Pease 
       violated his right to be free of malicious prosecution ... 
       pursuant to the Fourth Amendment." Compl. P 165. He 
       seeks damages for, among other items, the two years 
       and nine months he was incarcerated in state prison 
       after his conviction. Id. at P 174. 
 
                                17 
  
2000 WL 772819, *3 (emphasis added). However, damages 
for post-conviction injuries are not within the purview of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Donahue's brief cites neither Torres nor Gallo, and his 
only mention of Albright offers little support for his position 
in view of the holdings in those cases. He refers to Albright 
only by way of arguing its "doctrinal shift . . . in the law of 
malicious prosecution." He argues "[b]efore Albright, 
malicious prosecution claims were regularly understood to 
be grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause . . . Since Albright . . . malicious prosecution claims 
have been most often understood as Fourth Amendment 
violations." Appellant's Br. at 23. However, he does not 
begin to establish the required nexus between the alleged 
Fourth Amendment violation and the damages he alleges. 
 
After noting that Donahue is attempting to recover for 
post-conviction injuries, the district court correctly stated: 
"[Donahue] is unable to recover damages for post-conviction 
incarceration based upon any alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation." (citing Torres, 163 F.3d at 173-74). 2000 WL at 
*3. We agree. In fact, we need only substitute the names of 
the plaintiffs to show how neatly Donahue's claim is refuted 
under the holding in Torres. In Torres, we stated: "[t]his 
case, however, concerns the other end of the Fourth 
Amendment continuum -- post-conviction incarceration. 
Although Fourth Amendment seizure principles may in 
some circumstances have implications in the period 
between arrest and trial, we conclude that [Donahue's] 
posttrial incarceration does not qualify as a Fourth 
Amendment seizure." Torres, 163 F.3d at 174. 
 
Donahue alleges he became 
 
       ill emotionally and physically by the defendants' 
       egregious misconduct -- he has lost his reputation, his 
       family, his home, his savings, and other property, the 
       respect and confidence of the community in which he 
       lives, his investment in his education, and his business 
       and career (he has lost future earnings in excess of 
       $2,000,000) and was forced to spend over 2 years and 
       9 months in prison only to find that he incurred debt 
       beyond his control due to the defendants' unlawful 
       conduct. 
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Complaint at P 174 (emphasis added). 
 
Like Gallo, Donahue can establish a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, and he may have incurred some "injury" as a result 
of that seizure. However, even at this late date, he makes 
no attempt to distinguish between damages that may have 
been caused by that "seizure", and damages that are the 
result of his trial, conviction and sentence. Consequently, 
he has not even attempted to establish the Fourth 
Amendment violation that is the condition precedent to 
establishing his malicious prosecution claim. 
 
We realize, of course, that modern rules of pleading do 
not require a great deal of specificity. See Frazier v. 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 785 
F.2d 65, 68 (3rd Cir. 1986) (discussing "the specificity 
requirement in civil rights cases" for purposes of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8.). However, the defect in Donahue's complaint is 
not that he has pled a cause of action with inadequate 
specificity. Rather, it is that the specificity he has pled 
reveals that he is trying to recover for injuries that are 
unrelated to the constitutional guarantee his claim is 
predicated upon. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 174. 
 
Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that Donahue 
has not met his burden of demonstrating that the 
defendants' "conduct violated some clearly established 
statutory or constitutional right." Sherwood , at 399. The 
district court noted this defect and stated: "[s]ince I need 
not decide the issue, . . .[ ] I express no view as to whether 
plaintiff 's post-conviction incarceration violates some other 
constitutional provision, such as the procedural component 
of the Due Process clause[ ]." 2000 WL 772819. However, 
Donahue's S 1983 action is limited to a Fourth Amendment 
violation based upon malicious prosecution. We need go no 
further.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. In Torres, we read Albright as "standing for the broader proposition 
that a section 1983 claim may be based on a constitutional provision 
other than the Fourth Amendment," including "procedural due process 
or other explicit text of the Constitution." 163 F.3d 172, 173. However, 
because Donahue's S 1983 malicious prosecution claim is based only on 
the Fourth Amendment it ought not to be analyzed under procedural due 
process notions, or on any other explicit constitutional guarantee. 
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However, even if we overlook this defect in Donahue's 
cause of action and assume arguendo that some 
unidentified (and unidentifiable) quantum of his damage 
claim results solely from his seizure and pretrial detention, 
we would still be constrained to find that he has not 
established the tort of malicious prosecution. "One element 
that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution 
action is the termination of the prior criminal proceeding in 
favor of the accused." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 512 
(1994).19 
 
Section 659 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1976) 
provides: "[c]riminal proceedings are terminated in favor of 
the accused by 
 
       (a) a discharge by a magistrate at a preliminary 
       hearing, or 
 
       (b) the refusal of a grand jury to indict, or 
 
       (c) the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the 
       public prosecutor, or 
 
       (d) the quashing of an indictment or information, or 
 
       (e) an acquittal, or 
 
       (f) a final order in favor of the accused by a trial or 
       appellate court. 
 
(emphasis added).20 "The usual method by which a public 
prosecutor signifies the formal abandonment of criminal 
proceedings is by the entry of a nolle prosequi. " Id. S 659, 
com. c, illus. e. As noted above, the trial court entered a nol 
pros here. However, while "a grant of nolle prosequi can be 
sufficient to satisfy the favorable termination requirement 
for malicious prosecution, not all cases where the 
prosecutor abandons criminal charges are considered to 
have terminated favorably." Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d at 
579-580. A nol pros signifies termination of charges in favor 
of the accused "only when their final disposition is such as 
to indicate the innocence of the accused" Id. S 660, cmt. a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Heck was decided just four months after Albright. 
 
20. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted S 659 in Haefner v. 
Burkey, 626 A.2d 519, 521 (Pa. 1993). 
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(emphasis added) Accordingly, in Hector v. Watt , 235 F.3d 
154, 156 (3d Cir. 2000), we stated that a S 1983 malicious 
prosecution plaintiff "must be innocent of the crime 
charged in the underlying prosecution." 
 
As noted above, the charges against Donahue were 
dismissed pursuant to a nol pros in part because of a 
change in the law of corrupt organizations. The state had 
the option of retrying Donahue on the remaining drug 
distribution and conspiracy charges but elected not to. The 
Berks County District Attorney filed a motion which stated: 
 
       In an opinion dated August 27, 1993, the Superior 
       Court reversed the judgment of sentence and 
       remanded for a new trial due to the failure of the .. . 
       trial judge . . . to give a "corrupt and polluted source" 
       charge to the jury. Upon remand for the new trial, all 
       seized drugs which relate to the corrupt organization 
       charges became irrelevant to the remaining charges of 
       possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana 
       with intent to deliver and criminal conspiracy because 
       of a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of 
       Pennsylvania which required the trial court to dismiss 
       the corrupt organization charges. Certain intercepted 
       conversations then became irrelevant because they did 
       not pertain to the remaining charges. In addition, the 
       defendant has already served approximately 2 years, 7 
       months and 23 days, and if convicted, the defendant 
       would most likely not receive any additional jail time. 
       Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy and to 
       preserve scarce judicial resources, the Commonwealth of 
       Pennsylvania, in exercising its prosecutorial discretion, 
       requests entry of a Nolle Prosequi Order. 
 
App. at 1308 (emphasis added). 
 
It is clear from even a cursory reading of the request for 
a nol pros that the resulting dismissal can hardly be 
described as "indicat[ing] the innocence of the accused." 
The prosecutor simply reasoned that Donahue was not 
likely to receive any additional jail time if convicted in a 
retrial, and concluded that further prosecution was 
therefore not an appropriate use of limited resources. Far 
from indicating Donahue's innocence, the nol pros merely 
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reflected an informed and reasoned exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion as to how best to use those limited 
resources. It does not suggest that Donahue was innocent 
of the remaining criminal charges. Accordingly, there is no 
way that Donahue can establish the malicious prosecution 
that is necessary to establishing the constitutional violation 
he has alleged as the basis of his S 1983 civil rights claim, 
and the defendants are entitled to judgment for that 
reason. 
 
IV. 
 
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
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